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Abstract 
This paper examines three questions: the level and intensity of the tangible 
services that adult children provide their aged parents; the content of what 
they give and get from each other; and the consequences of these activities 
for the sense of well-being that the aged feel about their own lives. I present 
some data that is relevant for an exploration of these questions. The data 
are based on a Harris poll conducted for the Commonwealth Fund in the 
Spring of 1991. The term »solidarity« is based on the idea that the feeling of 
togetherness, based on close family ties provides a basis for identification 
which, in turn, leads to a willingness to provide mutual assistance. 
Solidarity also occurs in the public sector via the institutional arrangements 
of social security. which is commonly referred to as the »generational 
contract«. The public and familial represent two different forms for the 
expression of solidarity between generations. One of the most interesting 
and important policy questions concerns the impact of these two systems 
of generational transfers on each other.  
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Introduction 
This paper examines three questions: the level and intensity of the tangible 
services that adult children provide their aged parents; the content of what 
they give and get from each other; and the consequences of these activities 
for the sense of well-being that the aged feel about their own lives. I present 
some data that is relevant for an exploration of these questions. The data 
are based on a Harris poll conducted for the Commonwealth Fund in the 
Spring of 1991. A cross-section of approximately 900 people aged 65 and 
older was interviewed in each of the five countries: the United States (910 
interviews), Canada (930 interviews), the United Kingdom (940 interviews), 
West Germany (948 interviews), and Japan (900 interviews). A household 
member age 65 or older was asked to respond to questions about his or her 
life and living arrangements, daily activities, social and family contacts, 
work, life satisfaction, family and informal support, access to and use of 
health care services, and attitudes toward health services and the health 
system. 
The sampling methods used generally operated on a two-stage 
random sampling designed to obtain a nationally representative sample in 
each country. Survey results are weighted to provide estimates that are 
representative of the full elderly population in each country. Telephone 
interviews were used in the United States and Canada, and in-person 
interviews in the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Japan due to the 
relatively low proportion of the elderly population with home telephones in 
those countries. Response rates (calculated as interviews and completed 
screen outs of ineligibles divided by all contacts) were 70 percent in the 
United States, 79 percent in Canada, 95 percent in the United Kingdom, 88 
percent in West Germany, and 89 percent in Japan.  
This paper is organized around what I call the 4 »Ps« of generational 
solidarity: priors, practice, plausibility and policy. By »priors«, I mean the 
kinds of expectations that individuals hold about the lives of the aged. These 
are reasonable assumptions about what an inquiry into family solidarity is 
likely to find. They may be based on theoretical expectations, conventional 
wisdom, or inferred from everyday experience. By practice or praxis, I mean 
what one actually finds in survey data and presumably sets as a standard 
for understanding what aged family relationships are actually like in a 
random sample of the aging population. Reporting the results of survey data 
can be tedious if the data are not related to priors which tell us whether we 
should be surprised by, or suspicious of,  the findings. Priors are a good 
guide for the detection of errors in the data. Priors provide a guide for 
distilling meaning from statistical evidence. I stress priors rather than 
theory, since I have not found a well-formulated conceptual framework to 
guide this data analysis. Plausibility asks for a reconsideration of whether 
to trust the priors or the praxis in the case of a disparity. This is particularly 
important in this essay, since we highlight a very sharp difference between 
expectation and practice. Policy refers to the actionable implications that 
follow from, or are consistent with, our understanding of the prevailing 
pattern of the family of inter-generational solidarity. Of course, policy is 
based on the combination of priors and preferences and is not simply 
guided by practice. Value judgments will always influence the interpretation 
of data and the attractiveness of policy options. It is the purpose of this 
paper, however, to explore policy implications that are more grounded in an 
analysis of the discrepancy between priors and praxis.  
A brief description of the meaning of public and inter-generational 
solidarity and how they are linked may be useful here. The term »solidarity« 
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is based on the idea that the feeling of togetherness, based on close family 
ties provides a basis for identification which, in turn, leads to a willingness 
to provide mutual assistance. Solidarity also occurs in the public sector via 
the institutional arrangements of social security. which is commonly 
referred to as the »generational contract« because current pensioners 
receive benefits which are being paid for  by the money currently contributed 
by the working age population. There are two important caveats to the 
conventional understanding of this contract. The first  caveat is that  
pensions include survivors and dependents. In the United States, this 
means that the pension program provides transfers for several million 
children, many of whom are attending college.  In fact there are more 
children receiving social insurance pensions than are on the public welfare 
rolls of Aid to Families with Dependent Children ( AFDC) . The second 
caveat is that pensions are used to regulate the exit from work and in this 
sense serve as a manpower policy determining access to work. The 
generational contract thus demarks both the last stage of work and the 
entry into the welfare state. It is as much about exit from work as entry into 
the pension system1.  
Generational solidarity in the public sector also occurs through the 
flow of transfer payments and services to different age groups, broadly 
categorized as children, adults, and aged persons. This allocation of public 
resources to the aged and children has given rise to a question of whether 
today's children are being treated fairly relative to the aged. The data 
provoking this question show that about one-third of the children born in 
1970 in the United States will experience some years in poverty by age 10. 
Using cross sectional data we find that in 1970 15 percent of all children 
were in poverty and by 1990 the proportion increased to 20 percent. By 
contrast, in 1970 one-quarter of the aged were poor, but by 1990 the 
proportion had declined to 12 percent.2 Inter-generational family solidarity 
also occurs in the flow of money and services between adult children and 
their aged parents.  
All three meanings of solidarity are closely linked, and each may 
influence the other in important, if little understood, ways. The level of 
pension benefits that the aged get from the adjacent working generation, 
what they receive relative to the young in services received, and the 
payment of taxes, i.e., the net level of resources they acquire relative to 
other age groups, influence both what the aged have to give to their children 
and what their children and grandchildren, in turn, need.  
The public and familial represent two different forms for the expression 
of solidarity between generations. One of the most interesting and important 
policy questions concerns the impact of these two systems of generational 
transfers on each other. A major issue of public policy is whether the public 
generational contract and age specific resource distribution have redefined, 
strengthened or undermined the private inter-generational solidarity between 
aged parents and their adult children. Does it lead to crowding in or 
crowding out? This is the central policy issue – how do the different forms of 
public solidarity at a societal level influence the extent of family solidarity?  
                                                                 
1 Martin Kohli, »Public Solidarity Between Generations: Historical and Comparative 
Elements.« (Paris, October 1993, Mimeographed), 5.   
2 Lawrence J. Kotlikoff and Jagadeesh Gokhale, »The Equity of Social Services Provided to 
Children and Senior Citizens,« NBER Working Paper No. 4305 (March 1993), 3–4. 
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I. Extent of Generational Participation 
Modernization is the most developed theory for formulating priors about the 
flow of services between adult children and their aged parents. 
Modernization theory focuses on the economic transition from an 
agricultural economy to an industrial and service economy characterized by 
urbanization, the nuclearization of the family, geographic mobility, and the 
erosion of the traditional norms of family obligation and reciprocity. In pre-
modern societies the basic system is one where adult children take care of 
their aged parents. The main mechanism for maintaining the sense of filial 
responsibility is the control of property, the age of marriage, and the choice 
of partner. »One of the oldest and most widely accepted theories in the field 
of aging is that modernization gives rise to a loss of prestige and control 
over resources by older persons which has the effect of lowering the 
likelihood and extent of support that parents can expect to receive from 
children.«3 Modernization theory calls attention to the shift in responsibility 
from the family to a public solidarity system described at the beginning of 
this paper. The existence of the welfare state influences, in turn, the 
willingness of families to provide financial support and services to their aged 
parents. 
Talcott Parsons argued that on theoretical grounds one would expect 
to find a link between the organization of family life and the changing 
industrial structure. In his view, nuclearization of the modern family was its 
central outcome. This theory called attention to the trends for children to live 
not only independently from their aged parents, but also to be 
geographically separated. In addition, a theory about the shifting private-
public mix asserted that the development of a mature welfare state provided 
the aged with adequate income to live on their own, thus making it feasible 
to weaken generational solidarity by providing substitute resources. The 
inference suggested by both theories was that since the aged increasingly 
lived alone and their children resided in different cities, there was a risk of 
social isolation as children began to forsake and abandon their social 
obligation and commitment to their aging parents and instead to rely on the 
state. This interpretation came also to be accepted as conventional 
wisdom. Personal observation seemed to reinforce and support the theory. 
To a surprising extent, public views about generational relationships 
are consistent with the theory that the aged have lost contact with their 
children and feel isolated and alone. When the general public in a recent 
Eurobarometer study was asked about the main problems that older people 
confront in their lives, loneliness, isolation, and lack of friends was identified 
as a main problem in 40 to 46 percent of persons over the age of 25.4 The 
empirical data about actual activity patterns between children and their aged 
parents appears to be different from the public perception of that behavior. 
One possible interpretation of this observation is that theories about 
generational relations enter public discourse via the media and shape the 
                                                                 
3 Estelle James, chapter 2 in »Informal Systems of Old Age Security,« Washington D.C. 
World Bank Report on Income Security for Old Age 1994.  
4 Alan Walker, »Age and Attitudes: Main Results from a Eurobarometer Survey,« 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1993), 16. The special follow up survey was 
carried out in the 12 member states of the European Community by a questionnaire carried out 
in April/May 1992. About 400 people aged 60 and over were interviewed. In Germany 800 
were interviewed to take account of the difference between East and West. The data were 
analyzed by Alan Walker. 
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wider view that people hold. The result is a discrepancy between discourse 
and practice. 
The data we report show that there is extensive and frequent family 
contact between aged parents and their adult children in all five countries 
that were surveyed. Of course, any cross-sectional data is subject to the 
criticism that the level of family support might have been higher in the past. 
Before presenting the data it is important to deal with this objection. A 
special survey of the population aged 60 and over was carried out in the 
European community in April 1992. This survey asked whether families are 
less willing to care for older relatives than they were in the past. The 
findings show that, at least in Germany and the UK, the countries for which 
we present data, three-quarters of the aged do not agree strongly with the 
proposition that families are less willing to care for older relatives than they 
used to be. Of course, this kind of attitudinal data is not a substitute for a 
longitudinal comparison of actual practice. Based on this information it 
would appear that there may not be a very wide discrepancy between the 
past and the current reality. But the data on living arrangements shows a 
dramatic decline in the proportion of elderly living with their children. 
Interpreting this objective data on the decline of coresidence suggests a 
weakling of solidarity between generations. Objective and attitudinal data 
thus appear to lead to different interpretations. Another way to think about 
the present and past is to examine the experience of adult children's 
commitment to their aged parents in less industrialized countries. Would 
we expect to find substantially more commitment of the aged to their 
children in less developed societies without a highly developed welfare 
state? A recent U.N. study in four developing countries shows that between 
18 percent and 56 percent of the aged regularly receive non-monetary 
support from their children. Regular support for children is highest in the two 
Asian countries (Thailand and Sri-Lanka) and lowest in the two Latin 
countries (Dominican Republic and Chile). These proportions for the Asian 
countries are not strikingly different from the findings in mature industrial 
economies.5  
Finally, Eggebeen and Wilhelm observe that there are more adult 
children of aged parents alive than ever before in history, and more of the 
aged live longer than ever before. They conclude that, taken together, these 
trends may have the effect of actually encouraging inter-generational 
solidarity. »Both the greater availability of family members and the greater 
need for personal care among the elderly are working to encourage 
intergenerational support from their children«.6  
What, then, is the present practice in our five-country study? More 
than 70 percent of all the individuals aged 65 and older report that they 
receive help from members of the family. There are some interesting country 
differences. For example, only 70 percent of the aged in the United States 
receive some form of family help compared to 82 percent and 85 percent in 
Japan and West Germany respectively. While the extent of family ties may 
differ across countries, what is impressive is the pervasiveness of family 
integration everywhere. Children not only maintain communication with their 
                                                                 
5 S. Chawla and M. Kaiser, »Developmental Implications of Demographic Change: Global 
Population Aging,« (U.N. Office at Vienna, June 1993), Table 14. 
6 David Eggbeen and Mark Wilhelm, »Patterns of Support Among Older Americans and 
Their Children,« in S. Bass and M.C. Barth, Aging and Active:  Dimensions of Productive 
Engagement Among Older Americans.  May 1993, 5.(New Haven: Yale University Press, 
forthcoming). 
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aged parents (»intimacy at a distance«) but they provide concrete care and 
services (»support without distance«). 
Of course, if the services they provide are given only on an ad hoc and 
infrequent basis, then we have only the claim that the aged are not 
abandoned, and there would be little support for the stronger assertion that 
children are an important support system. To explore this question in detail 
we present in Table 1 (see Appendix) a differentiated portrait of the 
percentage of aged who receive any help from their living children (Panel A), 
of those who receive any help, the percentage who get it on a regular basis 
(Panel B), and the percent of all the aged who receive regular help from their 
family. We desegregate the type of aid received and discuss this in the next 
section. 
Substantially more than half of those who receive help report that they 
receive this help on a regular basis. This means that between 40 percent to 
56 percent of all the aged receive some form of regular help from their 
children. Here country differences are important. In Anglo-American 
countries less than half of the aged can rely on their children for regular 
assistance. The proportion is only 39 percent in the United States and 49 
percent in the U.K. By contrast, 56 percent of the aged in West Germany 
and 53 percent in Japan depend regularly on their children for help. (See 
Table 1, Panel C). 
Our conclusions are broadly consistent with other empirical studies. 
Data from the Eurobarometer survey show that »family members are by far 
the main providers of care: two-thirds of the care being supplied to older 
people in the Eurobarometer survey comes from within their families«. While 
spouses play a large role as care givers (32 percent), »adult children were 
the most frequently mentioned carers« (40 percent).7  
On the other hand, the findings about the regularity or intensity of the 
aid provided differ in the two surveys. The Eurobarometer reports less than 
25 percent of older people receiving regular help with personal care or 
household tasks in West Germany and the U.K. The Harris study shows 
almost 53 percent and 49 percent respectively in these countries. The 
definitions of »regular« and the composition of the care provided may 
account for the different findings.  
In summary, we started with the prior that industrialization and economic 
development create a process which limits family integration by creating 
smaller and more nuclear families. This conventional view assumes that 
children in nuclear families move away geographically from the elderly 
parents and lose contact with them. The practice appears to be that there is 
a substantial amount of family contact, exchange of service and financial 
resources, and reciprocal giving and getting. Surprisingly other studies in 
the developing countries show that the level of family integration in the five 
mature industrial economies we have studied is not very different from that 
found in countries that lack a well-developed welfare state and are at an 
early stage in the process of industrial development. Moreover, there is little 
evidence that families residing in advanced economies are today less willing 
to care for older relatives than they used to be. 
What can we say about the plausibility of our findings given the strong 
priors? The key to the plausibility that adult children could provide services 
to their aged parents rests on the case of proximity. The children need to be 
close enough to their parents to provide regular services. A variety of current 
empirical studies seems to show that despite the expectation of high 
geographic mobility children live reasonably close, a process which may 
                                                                 
7 Op. cit. »Main Results from a Eurobarometer Survey,« 28–9. 
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have occurred with the parents moving to where the children reside or the 
reverse. The OECD study reports, »A number of studies in several countries 
have documented that off-spring live surprisingly close to their parents. Over 
time, the means of communication have improved for personal contact. It is, 
therefore, not so surprising that contacts between elderly parents and their 
‘extra-mural’ off-spring may even have increased, as has been found in 
Sweden.«8 On the other hand, studies in Britain report that one in three 
aged persons saw a friend or relative every day, argue that this level of 
social integration occurred despite spatial fragmentation,9 It seems clear 
that this literature that technological improvement of communication and 
spatial fragmentation does not address the issue of  the degree of 
proximity. Better data on the average distance between the elderly and their 
children is needed to help guide the interpretation about the plausibility of 
the findings. 
Another crucial issue is living arrangements. »The way people live 
together is fundamental to the pattern of giving and receiving care, both 
formal and informal.«10 This is an important insight, but unfortunately the 
OECD report from which this quote is taken provides no empirical data 
showing the relationship. What the study does point out is that there is a 
decline in co-residence, i.e., elderly living with their children, and an 
increase both in elderly living alone and living with their spouse. We provide 
some data from the Harris poll on this issue. First, we list in Table 2 (see 
Appendix) the data on living arrangements for our five countries. 
We are still in the process of creating a table cross-tabulating living arrange-
ments with the giving and receiving of care by adult children and aging 
parents. But it would appear that the variance in living arrangements is 
much wider than the distribution of care.  
II. The Content of the Exchange  
Another way of gauging the level of aged's involvement with their families is 
to explore the content of their interaction: what the aged receive from their 
children; what they contribute to their children; and what they give to each 
other in a kind of reciprocal exchange.  
The kind of concrete activities that comprise  generational solidarity 
will depend on the nature of the resources available to the recipient and the 
provider. The main resources that are to be distributed are time and money. 
The main factors which facilitate the ability to use these resources are 
proximity, especially co-residence, and capability, especially health. Socio-
economic status may be another facilitating variable if it is related to the 
willingness to commit the available resources. In other words, we need to 
distinguish intention and capability. 
Leaving aside the problems of gathering relevant data, let us identify a 
plausible distribution of the resources of time and money. The aged are 
most likely to have time and accumulated assets rather than a high current 
income flow. By contrast, the adult children will have more limited time, torn 
                                                                 
8 Gerdt Sudstrom, »Family Care for Frail Elderly People in OECD countries: An Overview of 
trends, Meeting of National Experts on the Care of Frail Elderly People«, November 2–4, 
1992, 6–7. 
9 Tony Maltby and Alan Walker, »Older People in Europe: Social Integration,« chapter 13 
in Report on Social Integration in the European Community, (1993), 4. 
10 Op. cit Sudstrom, 7. 
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between working and child care obligations, but their current economic 
position would become stronger with more opportunity for income growth 
over time. The evidence, at least for the United States, is that  the income 
of adult children begins to rise in response to the accumulation of education 
and work experience. In the meantime, the earned income of the aged 
parents begins to fall. »The average age of ‘overtaking’ with respect to 
household income is 29 for the young men, corresponding to an average 
age of 54 for the matched parents«.11 The aged also appear to have health 
capability to provide services. In most countries two-thirds or more of the 
aged report that they are in excellent or good health. Obviously, geographic 
proximity facilitates the flow of tangible support, while co-residence itself 
can actually represent an implicit financial contribution. In most of our 
countries about 10 percent to 15 percent of the aged live with their children, 
except in Japan where the proportion is over 60 percent. Of course, we do 
not know the dynamics underlying these figures because we cannot 
separate unmarried children who never left home from the aged who have 
moved in with their children, or the children coming back to take up 
residence in their parents' home. 
Given this simple formulation of resources and some evidence to 
support its plausibility, we would expect that the aged have time and should 
be the more frequent service providers and that the children have a higher 
current income and are in a better position to provide financial aid. What the 
evidence from French to American surveys seems to show is that the 
situation is reversed. The adult children of the aged are most likely to being 
involved in providing care when the aged are sick and less involved in 
providing money.  
A three-generational study by Claudine Attias Donfut in France documents 
that the net flow of monetary resources is from the aged to their children12. 
About one-third of the aged give financial help to their children or 
grandchildren. The financial help is largely for housing as their children 
embark on setting up their adult life. By contrast, only about 9 percent of 
the adult children give financial aid to their aged parents. On reflection, the 
results are not surprising when we distinguish assets from current income 
flow. We would expect aged parents to have accumulated a lifetime of 
resources which makes them able to help their adult children. The French 
study also confirms our hypothesis about giving of services. The study is 
currently analyzing the net quantities of transfers between parents and 
children and how much less current income the elderly have compared to 
their children. The study shows that 89 percent of children (age 49–53) give 
services to their aged parents (aged 68–92), and 49 percent of the aged 
provide services to their adult children. The aged clearly give fewer services 
than they receive. 
This information is available from two national American surveys The 
National Survey of Families and Households in the United States and the 
                                                                 
11 Mark Rosenzweig and Kenneth I. Wolpin, »Intergenerational Support and the Life-Cycle 
Incomes of Young Men and Their Parents: Human Capital Investments, Coresidence, and 
Intergenerational Financial Transfers«, in: The Journal of Labor Economics, Volume 11, No. 
1, January 1993, 98. This appears not to be the case in Germany, where »taking account of 
cohort effects, you observe a steady increase of labor income until retirement age. There is no 
such thing as the ‘famous’ hump-shaped age-income profile«. Personal correspondence from 
Axel Börsch-Supan. 
12 Claudine Attias-Donfut, »The Double Channel of Transmission: First Results of a 
Nationwide Research Project on Three Generations«, A paper presented at the European 
Conference : Older People and Solidarity between Generations. Paris, October 22, 1993. 
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Harris Survey of Productive Aging in the United States. Eggbeen and 
Wilhelm in a study of the patterns of support of aged parents to their adult 
children provide the relevant data from these two studies.13 Combining their 
data with our USA data from the five country international study from the 
Harris polls gives further confirmation for the inverse relationship between 
giving money and time. They report, depending on the survey, that between 
20 percent to 30 percent of aged parents report that they give money to 
their adult children, whereas our Harris survey shows that only 17 percent of 
adult children give money to their aged parents, and only 4 percent do so on 
a regular basis (see Table 1 – Panel C). If we turn to the giving of services, 
then between 38 percent to 55 percent of aged parents provide tangible 
services to their children, whereas 70 percent of adult children provide some 
services to their aged parents. A study by Kotlikoff in the United States also 
supports the main conclusion that although the aged have more time and 
less current income, they are more likely to give money to their children and 
receive services from them. Somewhat surprising is the finding that only 4 
percent of the aged parents that are poor or very poor receive regular 
financial aid from their adult children.14  
This finding of the reversed relationship between having time but giving 
money should not obscure the equally interesting finding that the aged play 
an important care-giving role for their children. Jens Alber cites a German 
study which shows that »over one-half of all children below age 3 are to a 
considerable extent looked after by their grandmother.«15 The limited supply 
of child care arrangements despite the growing share of married mothers in 
the labor force is an obvious interpretation. But the conclusions of this study 
seem to clearly contradict the data we report for Germany. The French 
study also confirms that the aged give less in service than they receive from 
their children. More comparative analysis is clearly needed in specifying the 
conditions under which both statements might still be true.  
The finding of an asymmetrical giving of financial aid between the 
generations must be understood in the generational accounting framework 
discussed at the beginning of this paper. The present generation of working 
adults are financing the aged population through the public social security 
program. And it is through this form that children are provide financial aid to 
their aged parents. But a comprehensive accounting scheme needs to take 
account of the flow of assets as well as income. Aged parents leave 
bequests to their adult children. In France at least 60 percent of the adult 
children own or will acquire housing from their aged parents.  
The plausibility of the findings depends in part on our understanding the 
motivation that underlies the observed behavior. There is considerable 
empirical support for the finding that the aged parents give relatively more 
money to their adult children and their children provide them with relatively 
more services, even though one might think that the aged have time and 
their children more money. The question is why. Unfortunately the 
necessary reliance on survey data to identify the pattern of giving provides 
little basis for understanding the motivations that underlie giving. To answer 
this question we briefly review a number of interpretations that have 
emarged in the literature. Some of these theories focus on the adult children 
                                                                 
13 Op.cit Eggebeen and Wilhelm, Figure 1. »Overall Giving of Assistance to Adult Children.« 
14 L.J. Kotlikoff and J.N. Morris, »How much care do the aged receive from their children? A 
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(Stark) others on the aged parents (Börsch-Suppan). But taken together 
these theories represent something of the range of interpretive approaches 
currently available. 
The demonstration theory developed by Oded Stark examines why 
adult children give services to their aged parents. Based on a American 
study of 13.000 persons in the national sample of families and households 
he finds that adult children who have young children are likely to visit or call 
their aged parents ten more times a year than adult children who are 
childless. He argues that the attention that adult children gives to their 
parents arrives from an effort to demonstrate to their own children how they 
would like to be treated when they are aged. Young children are more likely 
to learn to imitate their parents than older children, the theory predicts that 
the parents of these young children will be more attentive to the aged 
parents than those with older children. The theory also predicts that since 
daughters tend to live with older men and have a longer live expectancy than 
their husbands, they will be more attentive to their aged parents than 
sons16.  
This theory is neither based on direct exchange expectations or 
altruism. The former posits that you give to your parents because you 
expect them to give to you. The latter assume a moral duty, or obligation, or 
socialization, that needs no further instrumental explanation. Stark's 
demonstration theory proposes a third effect, namely, that you don't give to 
the person from whom you expect the benefit of the exchange. Instead you 
inculcate in your children the feeling of obligation so that they will give to 
you when they grow up. It is not a theory of altruism, because you are 
optimizing you own utility or best interest. Or course you can't be sure that 
your children will reciprocate. The adult children need to calculate the 
probability that this will occur. It partly depends on whether your children 
will in turn have children of their own, and in part on the form that the 
services to the aged parents takes. You get a stronger demonstration effect 
from visits, telephone calls and the provision of every day services than you 
get from the giving of money because the children can see and understand 
what is happening. Of course, the theory does not explain why adult 
children take care of their aged parents when their own children have left 
home and are independent, or when they have no children of their own. 
Another interpretation starts with the saving behavior of the aged. Axel 
Börsch-Supan proposes a theory that the consumption constraint of the 
aged parent accounts for their willingness to provide financial aid to their 
adult children. Analyzing German data on income and consumption, he 
observes that, immediately after retiring the aged increase their 
consumption and reduce their assets.17 They might, for example, sell their 
home and purchase smaller accommodation and then they actively engage 
in the hobby, travel and consumption culture which requires drawing on their 
savings pool. This decrease in saving occurs for about five years, then 
saving remains stable, but thereafter there is clear evidence that savings 
increase. Börsch-Supan's interpretation of the findings is that the aged 
suffer from consumption constraint, or consumption exhaustion due, he 
speculates, largely to declining health and increased fragility. The financial 
gift to their children might be viewed as a reluctant bequest. What else can 
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Press, 1995 (forthcoming). 
17 Axel Börsch-Supan. »Saving and consumption patterns of the elderly. The German case«, 
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the aged parent do with this increased savings other than to offer it as a gift 
to their children and grandchildren.  
In the Börsch-Supan explanation part of the puzzle for Germany 
disappears. Since he assumes that aged parents in Germany unlike the 
USA have as much or even more money than their adult children. So the 
German case does not provide a complete explanation. In Börsch-Supan's 
view the German pension system is annuitized income which means that 
the stream of future income payments do not continue beyond a person's 
death, with the exception noted earlier that payments for dependents and 
survivors will continue. Börsch-Supan believes that the German pension 
system is over annuitized. This creates an odd system, adult children 
transfer their present earnings to the aged in the form of a public pension, 
and the aged give back their savings as a monetary gift to their children. 
This anomaly arises because consumption declines and income is 
protected against inflation. The increase in savings might explain why the 
aged parents give money, but it does not explain why their adult children 
provide services to their parents.  
Kotlikoff offers the provocative thesis that transfers are not a debt or an 
obligation but simply a bribe. In his interpretation of why the aged parents 
give money, and their adult children and their children provide them with 
services, Kotlikoff starts from a different premise. He assumes that the aged 
would like more contact with their children than their children are prepared 
to offer. The monetary gift is a bribe. The children respond by offering 
service as repayment for the bribe. The theory assumes an exchange 
relationship with the service being contingent on the gift. We might add that 
social norms of obligation reinforce the exchange and soften its meaning as 
a market transaction in an environment of affection.18 
The same data is consistent with other theories; namely, that the pattern of 
giving and getting across generations is an expression of a generalized 
sense of obligation and caring. When any one, including family, needs help, 
the natural, or socially conditioned, response is to offer it, not in exchange 
or in anticipation of specific reciprocity, but as a generalized sense of 
commitment and feeling of responsibility. The model proposed by 
sociologist Robert Weiss is different than the rational exchange model 
proposed by the three economists. He views the continued parental giving 
as evidence of the importance for the aged parent to retain his or her 
position in the family, provided that he /she has resources sufficient to 
permit this giving. When the parent becomes the recipient, this situation 
suggests, that the parent has lost social position. The proverb »when the 
father gives to the son, God smiles, when the son gives to the father, God 
weeps« captures the social significance of asymmetrical giving from the 
aged parent to the adult children and grandchildren. The giving of baby-
sitting-services is simultaneously a gift to both the adult child and the 
grandchild. Of course, when the aged parent is in need, the sense of 
obligation and responsibility to care for the aged parent is virtually a 
compulsion to do the right thing to do whatever might be necessary to meet 
the aged parents needs, no matter how the child feels toward the parent. 
Obligation is a weak word for that compulsion. The pattern of inter-
generational giving is according to this theory driven by a desire not to loose 
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social position and by the compulsion to do the right thing when the aged 
parent is in need.19  
A British study of the relationship between adult children and aged parents 
interviewed 978 adults between 1985 and 1988 in an effort to identify family 
obligation by constructing a series of hypothetical cases. The findings are 
interesting and provide one approach for understanding our findings. Four 
themes emerge from their analysis: a) Adult children do not feel any 
obligation to provide regular financial aid to their aged parents. Both agree, 
however, that it is appropriate to turn to each other for help for the kind of 
small practical assistance that we report data on. b) They accept the 
principle of »partial aid,« which was developed by Litwak who argued that 
people expect to receive only part of the services which they need by family 
members, and the rest through formal organizations. The researches find 
support for this principle in their work. Partial aid is for them a way of 
balancing dependence and independence. We expect that this principle 
would be even stronger in the case of long-term daily care. c) Giving 
between the generations is expected to be asymmetrical. It works 
differently »up« and »down« the generations. d) While the principle of 
mutual responsibility is accepted, the meaning of how to translate the 
principle to action is context specific and not automatic. It is never obvious 
what should be done. The practice is always more complex than the 
normative principles which guided, therefore the out come is always 
uncertain.20 
While all these theories give an account of the motives of inter-
generational family solidarity, the implications of each theory for public 
policy is quite different. We consider this question in our concluding 
discussion. But here it is useful to observe that in the case of generalized 
reciprocity if someone else provides the service the donor is freed from the 
obligation. Paradoxically, as Estelle James points out in the case of 
altruistic motives, the public transfer displaces or crowds out the private 
transfer, since it does not make any difference who provides the service, 
only that it is available. However, if the motivation is exchange, »the public 
transfer need not crowd out the private transfer, or may not crowd it out 
completely.«21 
III. Intra-Family Transfers and 
Satisfaction with Life 
The most intuitive prior is the assumption »in the gerontological literature 
that social interaction, especially with family members, is important to the 
well-being of older people and their adjustment to old age.«22 In this view, 
we can infer that social integration is a precondition for leading a meaningful 
and satisfying life. Family solidarity is one clear expression of integration; 
hence, we might expect to find a strong relationship between family 
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integration and personal satisfaction. The only hint at a dissenting view that 
I can locate comes from an early study by Edward Banfield. He argues that 
strong family integration can create a disincentive to engage in non-family 
activities such as mutual aid with friends and neighbors or volunteering. He 
calls this phenomenon »amoral familism« and argues that intense family life 
can conflict with civic life and lead to economic and social backwardness.23 
In such terms we might expect that intense family links are suffocating and 
routinized and that »amoral familism« produces dissatisfaction with life, 
leading to a lack of variety and creating what Scitofsky called A Joyless 
Economy.24 
However, the more conventional wisdom holds that children are a 
burden to raise, but in old age they are a source of comfort, satisfaction, 
and protection against feeling lonely too often. But empirical evidence to pin 
down this intuition is elusive. The main reason is not the lack of data, but 
the problem of establishing the line of causality between family solidarity 
and satisfaction. Is satisfaction a consequence of generational solidarity, 
implying that the satisfaction is an effect or a positive consequence of 
giving, getting, and mutual inter-generational relations. But it is equally 
plausible that the reverse is true: a satisfying life is the cause of increased 
solidarity. We need to identify is the sequential pattern. Are individuals first 
satisfied, and this contentment leads them to reach out to family, or is the 
process one of compensation for the lack of satisfaction, which leads to a 
search for contact to offset the disappointment? If the two processes cancel 
each other out, there would be no clear results.25   
Recent literature asserting that »receiving and giving help improves the 
lives of the giver and receiver« is too strong, given the weak empirical 
evidence. When aged do not give money to their adult children, are they 
likely to feel very satisfied (66 percent vs 59 percent)? While giving help 
yields results in the right direction, the difference is much weaker (68 
percent feel very satisfied if they give help to their children compared to 66 
percent who do not give help.) The weak association between giving and 
satisfaction can causally go both ways.26 
It seems unlikely  that we resolve the issues surrounding weak 
findings and uncertain causality with cross-sectional data. It would, 
therefore, be more productive to try to redefine the question and be cautious 
in interpreting the available data. A more modest question is what is the 
association between a form of participation and satisfaction. This is an 
important question because it responds to the policy concern about the 
capacity of those who retire early to switch sources of satisfaction and 
meaning from work to family or community activities. This is especially 
relevant for those men and women for whom work in adult life was the 
primary source of constructing a meaningful life. Is there any evidence to 
show that those who are engaged in generational solidarity feel »very 
satisfied« with life and avoid »feeling lonely too often« as compared to other 
activities – work, volunteering, and participating in mutual exchanges with 
neighbors and friends?  
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There is clearly a gender dimension to this question if we assume that 
men are more preoccupied with the preservation of status in public activity 
than women without a working career. For men then, it is plausible to 
assume that generational solidarity is less likely to be a source of 
satisfaction and loneliness avoidance than other forms of participation. By 
contrast, women might derive satisfaction less from status enhancing 
activities and more from familial and relational exchanges. Over time 
established patterns of mutuality come to be taken for granted; whereas, a 
meaningful and satisfactory life requires variation and novelty. 
Even this brief sketch of the gender dimension of linking activity and 
satisfaction makes it clear that grounding these arguments with empirical 
evidence will be very demanding. What we propose is a very exploratory 
overview of the question of whether there is any pattern that relates 
generational activities of giving, receiving and exchanges with satisfaction 
and how does this compare with other forms of participatory aging as 
sources of satisfaction and loneliness avoidance. We must stress that this 
exercise is only partially explanatory, since we do not control for the 
important issue of the extent to which activities are cumulative or 
substitutive. (We consider this issue in future work.) What is at issue hear 
is whether activities replace each other, or whether they are cumulative, 
leading to a divided world of active and non-active aging.  
In examining the relationship between activity and well- being, it 
seems useful to distinguish the positive condition of being »very satisfied« 
with life from the negative position of »feeling lonely often.« The 
Eurobarometer survey reports that »despite high levels of social contact 
feelings of loneliness are present in a significant minority of older people«.27  
This conclusion, however, is based on results of the level of loneliness 
and satisfaction for the country as a whole and does not attempt to 
measure, at an individual level, the association between participation and 
the degree of satisfaction or loneliness. We report findings from the Harris 
survey on this association.  
Table 3 (see Appendix) shows those who claim that they are very 
satisfied with life in all five countries. Despite substantial variation in the 
level of satisfaction across countries the relationship between form and 
participation is relatively stable. Anglo-American countries have much 
higher levels of satisfaction among the aged (between 50 percent in the UK 
and 61 percent in the United States), whereas in West Germany the 
proportion is 41 percent and only 28 percent in Japan. What kind of family 
participation produces a level of satisfaction that is significantly above these 
national levels? Simply receiving help from family has virtually no effect on 
satisfaction. On the other hand acting as a care giver produces higher rates 
of satisfaction in every country, especially in the care of children, and 
sometimes in the care of the sick. It is giving to others, whether strangers 
(in the form of volunteering) or kin that seems to be most highly associated 
with satisfaction. The idea that giving not receiving, enhances well-being is 
intriguing. This thesis requires much further investigation. 
What impact does inter-generational reciprocity have on well-being? 
We speculated that mutuality would be more important than either getting 
or receiving, not necessarily in feeling satisfied, but at least in avoiding 
feeling lonely often. What we find is that in every country mutual aid is 
associated with higher than average levels of satisfaction, but lower than 
being a care giver to strangers or kin. Similar results occur if we measure 
the feeling of frequent loneliness. The strongest association with 
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satisfaction or avoidance of loneliness is giving to others and in some 
countries it is working. 
Now let us examine the situation in one country in more detail. 
Consider the experience of the aged in West Germany (see Appendix Table 
4). One of the most striking conclusions is how weak is the association 
between receiving help from adult children and life satisfaction. In fact, half 
of those who receive no help from their children report that they are very 
satisfied with life compared to only 40 percent who do get such help. Even 
more surprising is the finding that only one-quarter of those who receive help 
when in need report that they are very satisfied. This is substantially below 
the national average of 41 percent. On the other hand, not receiving help 
when in need produces a feeling of »being alone too often« in almost half of 
the cases (44.6 %). By contrast, doing things for others, such as baby 
sitting and caring for the sick and disabled, yields levels of satisfaction 
much higher than the national average and even stronger differences 
between those who are engaged in caring for others than those who are not. 
When family solidarity takes the form of mutual aid, it does not produce 
much difference in satisfaction from those who do not participate in inter-
generational reciprocity, but it does appear to reduce significantly the 
feeling of aloneness. A similar finding emerges for those engaged in mutual 
aid with neighbors. It is the failure to participate in mutuality that leads to 
both loneliness and dissatisfaction (reported as not-at-all satisfied). Finally, 
almost 60 percent of those engaged in volunteering and working (note the 
small number of cases) report being very satisfied with life. 
Family solidarity is important to well-being, not so much for the 
positive sense of satisfaction with life that it generates, but the absence of 
solidarity is more likely to be associated with loneliness and lower levels of 
satisfaction. Half or more of the aged who do not receive any form family 
help, or are working, or volunteering, are likely to feel very satisfied - a 
proportion substantially above the national average. 
The findings of a lack of association between satisfaction and family 
solidarity seem surprising, but there is no reason to doubt the plausibility of 
the proposition in the ways we argued above. What is not clear is the 
sequencing of events: what causes what in the link between activity and 
satisfaction. Moreover, it is plausible that activities are cumulative, i.e., 
individuals involved in family also tend to be involved in civic life. Instead of 
»amoral familism,« there might be a case for »generative familism,« with 
generational solidarity generating other forms of engagement. This line of 
argument requires further inquiry. The Harris data is rich enough to lead to 
some insights.  
IV. The Policy Question: Do Formal 
Public Systems Displace Informal 
Family Support?  
At the beginning of this paper, we identified three different forms of 
generational solidarity: the generational contract between workers and 
pensioners, the allocation of public services and transfers to the aged and 
children; and the giving and receiving of money and tangible services 
between adult children and their aged parents. We now consider again how 
these three solidarity systems are linked to each other. The policy question 
that needs to be addressed is how to design a public system of care and 
financing that does not undermine the informal inter-generational support 
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mechanisms that are currently available to the aged. Is it possible to design 
a formal public support system that strengthens and reinforces the informal 
system of adult children providing services to their aged parents? In other 
words, can a public policy of »crowding in« rather than »crowding out« be 
developed? Can the public domain reinforce the informal inter-generational 
solidarity that now prevails both between adult children and their aged 
parents and between aged parents and their children and grandchildren?  
Studying the interplay between the public and family domain 
(excluding inter-spousal monetary transfers and services), is difficult for 
several reasons. First, the issue is burdened with strong ideological 
positions about the limits of the welfare state and attempts to reverse the 
trend. As Christoph Conrad explains, »If the burden of the welfare state is 
caused by the shift of responsibility between state and family, then one 
solution is to shift the burden back.«28 This kind of argument is closely tied 
to the broader interest in opting out of the welfare state into various forms of 
personal or private social protection. The main thrust of these arguments is 
to show that the cost of expanding the state sector is too high because »it 
endangers some previous precious accomplishment.«29 In other words, the 
realization of one objective, economic security, puts in jeopardy another 
equally cherished objective, the sense of community and family solidarity.30 
The defenders of reforms designed to expand the public role in the provision 
of care to the aged, such as gerontologists, have launched what one 
analyst has called »a crusade against the myth of family withdrawal.«31 
This controversy among those who believe that public provision crowds out 
the family and those who believe not only that the family does not withdraw, 
but that formal aid reinforces family solidarity, via a process we identify as 
crowding in, has created a very large research industry providing empirical 
support for each position. 
The study of crowding out and crowding in is faced with two other 
conceptual difficulties. First is the question of competing interpretations 
about the motivations underlying why aged parents and their adult children 
provide services and money to each other. While data is available on the 
behavior, much less is known about the reasons why people do what they 
do (we have considered this debate above). The second difficulty arises 
when the same facts are compatible with competing views, and the 
complexity of the issues suggests that many contradictory processes are 
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at play. This situation has led Daatland to conclude that whatever is the 
outcome of the academic debate »the stable feature of the care system is 
that whatever the balance (between state and family provision), it is 
contested.«32 
But there is also a practical difficulty which can more readily be 
identified and addressed. Despite the normative debate it seems self-evident 
that »crowding out« and »crowding in« are most clearly explained by the 
design of the public care system. Unfortunately this is not the key issue 
under debate in countries that are trying to reform their services for the 
aged. In Germany the proposed design creates incentives for buying care 
and incentives to increase transfers from families with children to families 
without children. Axel Börsch-Supan believes that »both in terms of long run 
and short run impacts it is likely to produce even more crowding out rather 
than the opposite«33. It is not important if his theory is correct, but what is 
significant is that the debate is dominated by issues of financing rather than 
program design.  
How, then, can we deal empirically with a stable contested policy 
controversy? I believe that the best way is to try to redefine the question. 
There is good evidence for simultaneous and contradictory processes. Both 
crowding out and crowding in are observed in the real world. There is also 
evidence that the results are shaped by prior beliefs, and the assumptions 
influence the interpretation. We observe both types: contradiction and 
ideological distortion. One way of redefining the field is suggested by 
Daatland who argues that there is a life cycle effect: sometimes the family 
does everything, sometimes the state takes over (institutionalization), 
sometimes the state and the family share the tasks34. This is one plausible 
way to reinterpret the facts.  
My own agenda is to specify the conditions for identifying the 
mechanism that lead to crowding out and crowding in as the basis for public 
learning. I would like to see if an analogy can be drawn from a similar 
public-private debate about the interplay between the welfare state and the 
enterprise based social protection; hence, the relevant question is what 
conditions create different outcomes and how to design a policy to create 
the conditions for a public policy reinforcing family solidarity. This is the 
theme with which this paper began.  
Our study has shown that the giving of tangible services by adult 
children to their aged parents is quite extensive. Inter-generational solidarity 
is quite resilient in adapting to modern conditions. All the countries in our 
survey are struggling with how to develop a public solidarity care system for 
the older aged that can build on the foundations of inter-family solidarity. 
The need for such a policy is self-evident. Regardless of the outcome of the 
academic debate about the expansion or compression of morbidity with 
age, the very old will increase substantially. There are 37,000 centenarians 
today. By 2040, the Census Bureau in the United States projects an 
increase of 620,000, and a decade later an increase to 1.2 million.35 These 
figures provided a crude index of the emerging need for a care policy for the 
aged. Crowding in and crowding out remains a central theme in forging such 
a policy. 
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V. Conclusion 
We have presented empirical evidence in five countries about the pattern of 
inter-generational relations and have argued that there is strong evidence to 
show that children not only visit their aged parents, but in almost half of the 
cases provide them with services on a regular basis. This essay was only 
exploratory, but some of the tentative conclusions we reach are supported 
by other comparative studies. The French national inter-generational study 
lends support to the argument suggested by our data; namely, that while 
the aged have more time than money, they tend to give their children money 
in the form of gifts and they receive more services from their children than 
they give to them. This is a very provocative finding. We need a cross-
national study that interviews both the adult children and their aged parents 
and explores the issue of reciprocal flows of cash and services. 
We have only touched the issue of crowding out: the interplay between 
public provision and generational solidarity. Our study, using the perception 
of the aged themselves about the quality of the public care and income 
support system suggests that there is evidence for both crowding out and 
crowding in,  
i.e., public aid can reinforce or undermine generational solidarity. The 
interplay between the public and private transfer system has many 
subtleties and contradictions and variations by countries suggesting that 
crowding out does occur in some situations, but not in others. 
Understanding these conditions is essential to the design of sound public 
policy. What is needed is empirical work based on data of spending levels 
for health and income support and their impact on family solidarity. 
The literature on aging has not systematically examined the interplay 
between activity, well-being and status (both social and medical). Paul 
Johnson at London School of Economics is planning such an inquiry. Our 
data does bear on this question. We have found that giving to others, both 
family and strangers, seems to yield the highest degree of satisfaction and 
the lowest levels of feeling of isolation and loneliness. But as is 
characteristic of most social science research, an answer to one question 
immediately raises another, even more difficult issue. What is the line of 
causality between well-being and activity, does feeling good lead to 
engagement or the reverse, does engagement lead to satisfaction, or are 
both answers correct depending on the context? 
A closely related issue is whether activities are cumulative or 
substitutive for each other. We started to explore this and tentatively 
concluded that there is some evidence to support the cumulative argument. 
The issue is clearly important for public policy if there exists a significant 
minority among the aged that are disengaged from the various forms of 
participatory aging we have reviewed. Moreover, there is the minority who 
are excluded from expressions of family solidarity because they have no live 
children. In most countries one-fifth or more of the aged have no living 
children. We plan to explore further the well-being of the aged who have no 
adult children. What we have found is that while generational reciprocity 
may not yield satisfaction, its absence may contribute to loneliness. Some 
scholars have pointed out that there is a greater availability of family 
members today than at any point in history. But it is precisely this point 
that makes the feeling of relative deprivation even more difficult to deal with. 
Finally, there is the puzzling issue of how the aged construct a meaningful 
life in work-oriented industrial economies where meaning and work are so 
closely linked. We are exploring a partial answer to this question by 
examining how the activity mix and satisfaction levels change after the 
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individual retires. How does the retirement process itself affect the later 
ability to engage in and participate in social activities, in particular when 
individuals feel that they have been pushed out of the labor market 
prematurely and against their wishes? Our study has used age 65 as the 
working definition of aging, since the Harris survey only interviewed those 
above this age. But the overwhelming evidence suggests that individuals, 
especially men, are retiring much earlier and the problem of constructing a 
meaningful and constructive life is particularly urgent. In many of the 
countries we have studied, less than half of male wage and salary workers 
aged 55–65 are out of the labor force. In most of these countries, with the 
exception of Japan and perhaps the United States, exit is exit implying that 
the opportunities for finding work after exiting from the labor market are 
limited.36 The changing pattern of activity mix after retirement provides a 
good starting point for understanding the search for meaning. If the research 
question is a meaningful and satisfying life after retirement rather than 
productive aging, then the activity matrix needs to be broader than that of 
generational solidarity. Social integration includes for example the hobby 
culture, participation in political life, in the educational system, in self help 
groups, as well as integration with work, volunteering, care giving, mutual 
exchanges with neighbors and friends and generational solidarity. We have 
considered these activities as expressions of participatory aging because 
they represent the many ways that the aged are engaged and integrated in 
society. The availability of comparative data across five countries suggests 
how similar is the social process of aging across countries, but it also calls 
attention to striking differences across them.  
                                                                 
36 Martin Rein and Klaus Jacobs, »Ageing and Employment Trends.« In Paul Johnson and 
Klaus Zimmerman (ed), Labour Markets in an Ageing Europe, (New York:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1993). 
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Appendix 
Table 1 
What Adult Children Give Their Aged Parents 
Panel A: Percent of aged receiving any help from their adult children by the 
type of help they receive 
Activity Type USA Canada Japan UK West-
German
y 
sick 60 66 73 66 80 
house 33 42 58 50 52 
money 17 14 38 24 21 
transportation 34 42 58 48 65 
any family help 70 72 82 72 85 
Panel B: Of those who receive help from adult children the percentage who 
get it regularly 
Activity Type USA Canada Japan UK West-
German
y 
sick 58 54 65 67 54 
house 31 39 60 57 33 
money 22 41 45 51 34 
transportation 30 48 52 61 44 
any family help 55 57 68 68 62 
Panel C: Percent of aged receiving regular help from their adult children 
Activity Type USA Canada Japan UK West-
German
y 
sick 35 36 47 44 43 
house 10 16 35 29 17 
money 4 6 17 12 7 
transportation 10 20 30 29 29 
any family help 39 41 56 49 53 
How to read this table: In West Germany 52 percent of the aged get help in 
the house and 33 percent receive this help regularly. This means that 17 
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percent receive regular help from the family with household tasks (.52 x .33 
= 17).  
 
Table 2 
Percent Distribution of Living Arrangements by Country in 1992 
Country Living Alone Co-residence Living with 
Spouse 
Canada 41 14 41 
Japan 9 61 28 
Britain 33 10 53 
Germany 44 12 37 
United States 45 9 45 
Table 3 
Proportion of the aged who are "very satisfied" with life, by the type of 
activity they are engaged in. 
Activity  Ger USA Canada UK Japan 
total 40.6 61.0 58.3 49.6 27.6 
work 58.3 62.1 67.8 62.0 31.2 
volunteer 57.3 69.1 68.0 63.6 41.8 
watch children 44.6 65.5 71.8 61.3 37.6 
care of sick 49.6 66.2 59.3 53.6 32.1 
mutual aid of 
neighbors 
43.6 63.3 60.1 50.5 27.4 
informal help when in 
need 
24.2 39.5 40.4 39.7 31.4 
help from children 40.7 61.4 56.1 52.4 25.0 
inter-family mutual aid 43.0 65.6 61.8 59.6 35.2 
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Table 4 
The Relationship Between Activity  and Satisfaction in West Germany 
Life 
Satisfaction 
Baby-sitting Receiving Help 
from Family 
Mutual Aid in 
Family 
 yes no yes no yes no 
Very satisfied 44.6 39.7 40.8 50.0 43.0 41.8 
Somewhat 48.5 43.7 45.7 39.7 46.2 44.3 
Not at all 4.5 11.3 9.0 6.0 7.2 9.1 
Unsure 2.5 5.5 4.5 4.3 3.6 4.8 
Lonely too 
often 
14.4 24.9 21.1 22.4 13.4 24.2 
Number of 
cases 
202 746 665 116 223 558 
 Work Volunteer Mutual Aid 
Neighbors 
 yes no yes no yes no 
Very satisfied 58.3 39.9 57.3 38.1 43.5 24.1 
Somewhat 30.6 45.3 35.5 46.1 44.0 49.0 
Not at all 5.6 10.0 4.8 10.6 8.2 18.6 
Unsure 5.5 4.8 2.4 5.2 4.2 8.2 
Lonely too 
often 
5.6 23.4 12.0 24.0 21.0 31.7 
Number of 
cases 
36 912 124 824 803 145 
 Care for Sick Help in Need from 
Family / Friends 
Total 
 yes no yes no   
Very satisfied 49.6 39.3 24.3 23.8  40.60 
Somewhat 37.4 45.8 41.1 42.9  44.70 
Not at all 9.8 9.8 21.1 14.2  9.8 
Unsure 3.3 5.1 13.7 19.0  4.9 
Lonely too 
often 
13.8 24.0 25.5 44.6  22.7 
Number of 
cases 
123 825 95 42  948 
 
